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TWO ARGUMENTS ON PETITES PERCEPTIONS 
b.y Mark Kulstad 
The importance of perception for Leibniz is indicated by his claims that 
there exists nothing over and above simple substances and that there is 
nothing in simple substances but perceptions and their changes.' Perhaps the 
most intriguing element of his theory of perception is the view that, roughly, 
we have perceptions that we d o  not notice, perceptions of which we are not 
conscious, or, in Leibniz's words,petitesperceptions. It is this view that I wish 
to explore in the present paper. 
I will focus on two argumentsfound in the N ~ M ,  Essays Concerning Human 
Understanding. One may be called the regress argument. It opposes the claim 
that we reflect, or "think expressly," upon all our thoughts. The other may be 
called the experiential argument. It relies heavily on a claim that may seem 
paradoxical, namely, that we have experiential (or introspective) evidence for 
the existence of petites perceptions. The connection between the two argu- 
ments is that their conclusions, a t  least allowing the following plausible 
reformulations of them, are equivalent: 
(R) It is not the case that we reflect on or  notice all our perceptions, and 
(E) There are within us petites perceptions, i.e., perceptions which we 
do not reflect on or notice. 
Both arguments are important not only as  straightforward inferences to their 
conclusio~ls but also (and more importantly for my purposes) as  storehouses 
of suggestions about otherwise obscure aspects of Leibniz's theory of noticed 
and unnoticed perceptions. It is with the latter point primarily in mind that I 
turn to a consideration of first the experiential, then the regress argument. 
I. The Experiential Argument 
The experiential argument is found in the following passage, fairly early 
in the New Essays: 
often when we are not admonished, so to speak, and warned to take note of some of our 
own present perceptions, we allow them to pass without reflection, and even without being 
noticed; but if anyone d~rects  our attention to them immediately after, and makes us 
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notice, for example, some noise which was just heard, we remember it, and apperceive 
having had at the time some sentlrnent of it. Thus there were perceptions whichwed~d not 
apperceive at  once, apperception ansing in this case only . . after some interval, however 
smaIl it may be. (A VI. VI,  54; Ln, pp. 47-48) 
The clearest statement of the conclusion in the text is this: "Thus there were 
perceptions which we did not apperceive a t  once." If we use the language of 
the earlier part of the passage, we can state the conclusion as follows: there 
are perceptions which occur without being reflected on, or without being 
noticed. More simply, we can say that Leibniz concludes here that there are 
petites perceptions.2 
In arguing for this conclusion, Leibniz appeals, in an  oblique way, to a kind 
of case he thinks will be familiar to the reader. Let me try to make this more 
definite by providing a concrete example of the sort of case Leibniz has in 
mind. Suppose A and B a r e  using a two-man saw in a backyard. Being inex- 
perienced, they are concentrating intently on their work. A ,  however, notices 
an unusual noise coming from a busy intersection nearby. "Did you hear 
that?" he asks. "What?" responds B. A replies, "It sounded like an  accident 
just a moment ago.""Oh, yes,"says B. "I believe I did hearthat. D o  you think 
there really was an  accident?" 
I t  will help if we cast this in Leibnizian terms. A had a perception of the 
noise and a t  once noticed it, or reflected on it, or apperceived it.' Balso had a 
perception of the noise but, for whatever reason, allowed it t o  pass without 
reflection. Yet a moment later, when A brought the noise to B's attention, B 
was able to recall having perceived the noise, or, t o  use Leibniz's language, he 
apperceived the perception of the noise. In short, B did not apperceive the 
perception immediately after it occurred, but only after a short interval had 
elapsed.4 
This example should make clearer the sort of case Leibniz has in mind. But 
just how, it might be asked, does such a case show what Leibniz evidently 
wants t o  show, namely, that there are petites perceptions? 
The case is pertinent in that it provides Leibniz with (what may seem 
surprising) experiential o r  observational evidence of the existence of perites 
perceptions. Leibniz would like to  say, for instance, that when Bapperceives 
his perception of the noise after some interval has elapsed, he is actually 
apperceiving, or has experience of, a petite perception and hence knows that 
there are petites perceptions. 
This may seem puzzling; for it is customarily believed that aperite percep- 
tion is precisely one of which we have no experience, which we d o  not 
apperceive. But the experiential argument indicates (and this is one of its chief 
merits) that this belief needs to be modified. What the argument indicates is 
that a petite perception is one that is not reflected on or apperceived immedi- 
ate1.v after it is experienced. This does not a t  all rule out the possibility that the 
very same perception may be reflected on or apperceived after some interval 
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has elapsecl. And it is just this possibility that Leibniz exploits in the present 
argument, by pointing to cases in which we (apparently) notice perceptions 
only some time after they occur. 
But we cannot leave the argument with this, for there is a crucial step that 
Leibniz leaves unmentioned. Consider again the structure of the argument. 
Leibniz wants to prove that there arepetites perceptions. T o d o  this he points 
to cases in which we seem to  be aware of past perceptions that were not, as  a 
matter of fact, reflected on at the time they occurred. But such awareness is 
not sufficient to prove that there are petites perceptions; for in addition to 
having experience of (and hence, I assume, knowledge of) the existence of a 
certain past perception, which as a matter of fact was not reflected on (at the 
time it occurred), one must also have experience or knowIedge of the fact that 
it was not reflected on. This is the point that Leibniz simply passes over. 
Now it might be responded that although Leibniz failed to mention this 
point, he was not at all unjustified in assumingthat a person would knowthat 
he had failed to reflect on a perception experienced a moment or so before. I 
think this is right, but I also think it reveals something that is of no little 
consequence. Leibniz is justified in this assumption only if reflection is a 
conscious process. For if reflection were, a t  least sometimes, an unconscious 
process, it would be questionable whether we wouId ever be justified in 
claiming that we had failed to  reflect on a perception experienced a moment 
before. Thus, the second key point about the experiential argument (the first 
key point, it wiIl be recalled, is that a petite perception is one that is not 
reflected on immediareiv after it is experienced) is that it suggests rather 
strongly that Leibniz viewed reflection as a conscious process. (This important 
point will be examined again in the discussion of the regress argument.) 
11. The Regress Argument 
The regress argument is set out by Leibniz as follows: 
~t 1s easy to show . . that it 1s ~rnpossible for us always to think expressly upon all our 
thoughts, otherw~se, the spirit would reflect upon each reflect~on to lnfinlty w~thout  ever 
belng able to  pass to a new thought. For example, In my consciousness of some present 
feeling. I should always thlnk that 1 thlnk and st111 thtnk that I thtnk of my thought. and 
thus to lnflnlty But ~t IS very necessary that 1 cease reflect~ng upon all these reflect~ons, and 
that there be at length some thought whlch ~sal lowed to pass w~thout  hlnklng of ~ t ,  other- 
wise, we should dwell always upon the same thlng (Ln, pp. 118-1 19, A vi VI,  118) 
In the following three sections I shall discuss first the conclusion of the 
argument; second, certain temporal difficulties associated with the argument; 
and third, a problem concerning the role of consciousness in the argument. 
(Since this passage contains suggestions that have importance for several 
areas of Leibniz's thought, I shall sometimes go beyond what is immediately 
relevant to  the regress argument.) 
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A. "I~npossihili t~~ " 
First, it should be noted that Leibniz's statement of the conclusion is 
misleading. He says, "it is impossible for us always to think expressly upon 
all our thoughts." What is troublesome here is the word 'impossible.'I do  not 
think he means it in his usualstrict sense, one in which a proposition is impos- 
sible just in case it implies a contradiction. Of course, he does think that 
Locke's claim, that we always think expressly upon all our thoughts, leads to 
an absurdity of sorts, namely, that we "dwell always o n  the same thing." But 
this is not contradictory; rather, it is, as a matter of fact, false. Hence, the 
conclusion of Leibniz's argument might be better formulated as follows: we 
c/o no/ think expressly upon all our thoughts. 
B. Temporal Diffirrrlties 
A second point is that the regress argument indicates clearly that, on 
LeibnizS view, reflection takes some time, or, t o  put it more exactly, an 
infinite sequence of reflections takes a n  indefinitely long time to run through. 
It follows from this that a reflection on a thought is not perfectly simultaneous 
with the thought, for if it were, then a reflection on a reflection (itself a 
thought) would also be simultaneous with the original thought, and so on, so 
that an infinite sequence of reflections would last not a moment longer than 
the original thought. 
1 think this is fairly clear from the regress argument itself. But since the 
point is important, I would like to  solidify it by considering a later passage in 
the Nett> E.rsaju: 
present or Immediate memory, or the memory of what passed tmmediately before, I e., the 
consciousness or  reflect~on wh~ch accompanies internal action, cannot naturally decelve. 
Otherwise, one could not be certain even that one thinks this or that thing, because ~t ts 
only about a past action that one says this w~th ln  oneself and not about the action Itself 
whlch says t h ~ s .  (Ln, p 248; A vi. VI,  238) 
The view that arises from this passage is the following: we have a thought, that 
is, we think this or that thing; then we reflect on this thought, this action; the 
reflection is itself a n  action, but not the same action as the one that is reflected 
on; rather, it is an action that occurs irnrnecl~areb>after the original thought. 
Thus, this passage confirms the point made above, namely, that for Leibni7 
the act of reflection is not simultaneous with but subsequent to the thought 
reflected on. 
A question arises here. Does it follow from the fact that a reflection occurs 
a bit after what is reflected on that a n  infinite sequence of reflections will 
continue indefinitely? The answer is no.  Suppose, for example, that the first 
reflection takes place a half second after the original thought, the second 
reflection, one-quarter second after the first, the third, one-eighth second 
after the second, and so on; then no matter how many reflections are involved, 
the whoIe process can take no more than a second. A.fortiori, it will not 
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continue indefinitely.' This points to the first temporal difficulty to  be con- 
sidered, namely, why should one conclude that an  infinite sequence of reflec- 
tions will continue indefinitely? 
One answer, of course, is that the temporal gap between perception and 
reflection is never shorter than some specifiable interval. Unfortunately, 
Leibnil seems to  deny that there is any interval at  all. In the regress argument 
he speaks of reflection as a memory of "what passed immediate!v before" 
(emphasis mine). And the point is reinforced by what Leibniz says in the 
experiential argument. In that context he claims that when we notice a 
perception "after some interval, however small it may be" instead of "at once" 
( I  take this to mean immediately after, with no time intervening), we may 
truly say that the original perception occurred "without reflection" (Ln, p. 
48). This suggests that Leibniz means "immediately before" quite strictly: 
action .r occurs immediately before action y only if there is no  interval, "how- 
ever small it may be," between the moments at  which x and !, occur. This 
leaves a problem, however: since it is commonly held that between any two 
moments there is an infinity of moments (and hence, presumably, an  interval), 
it is hard to  see how any action can be immediately before any other. This 
brings us to the second temporal difficulty, namely, what clear sense can 
Leibni7 assign to the phrase 'immediately before'that will enable him to  make 
his point about reflection without paradox? 
The above observations turn at  least in part on the assumption that an  
action occurs at  a moment, i.e., instantaneously. There is, however, no 
obvious reason to assume this. Actions (most crucially, those of perception 
and reflection) might take time to  perform. Indeed, this seems to be Leibniz's 
view, for he says that "action requires a period of time" (Ln, p. 702) .~  
Given this, I would like to propose a theory that saves Leibniz from tem- 
poral difficulties such as the ones raised above. The theory is consistent with 
the text (though at  points going beyond it), and provides a more precise idea 
of what occurs in reflection. 
On this theory, perceptions and reflections are actions that  are not instan- 
taneous but take some finite amount of time to  perform. (I shall assume that 
there is some lower bound here, some period of time so short that n o  percep- 
tion or reflection could run its course complerely within such a n  interval.) 
Further, if x is a perception and y is a reflection on x, and if x ends a t  time t ,  
then to say that y occurs immediately after x is to say thaty  occurs during the 
interval comprising every moment after I up to  and including some later 
moment I' (intuitively, the moment a t  which reflection .v ceases).' Similar 
remarks could be made about any higher order reflection. 
On this theory the two problems mentioned above vanish. An infinite 
sequence of reflections on  reflections would continue indefinitely into the 
future. And the phrases 'immediately before' and 'immediately after' would 
be assigned a reasonably clear sense, T o  sum up, probing a little into the 
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temporal difficulties of the regress argument has suggested a theory that 
clarifies the argument, resolves the difficulties mentioned above, and may be 
of assistance in dealing with other parts of the Leibnizian text. I shall assume 
the theory in what follows. 
C. Conscious Thoughts 
I turn now to  a third issue connected with the regress argument, namely, 
the assumption that an infinite regress of reflections would somehow block 
us from passing to  a new thought. (It seems plausible to  say that by the term 
'new thought,' Leibniz means a conscious thought which is different from and 
not a reflection on any immediately preceding thought.) 
One might come to believe that Leibniz is assuming here that since we 
cannot have more than one perception at any given moment, the presence of 
a reflection-itself a perception8-rules out the possibility of any other per- 
ception (a.fortiori, any other thought) being present in us a t  the same moment. 
But given Leibniz's statement in the preface of the New Essays that there are 
many, indeed infinitely many perceptions present within us at each moment 
(Ln, p. 47), he cannot be assuming this. Hence we must ask: why does Leibniz 
think that the presence of a reflection a t  a moment excludes the possibility of 
our having a new thought (different from the reflection) a t  that moment? 
An easy response is that Leibniz is not thinking about just any perceptions 
in his views on blocking, but about what he would call apperceptions (and 
what we might call conscious thoughts). He is assuming, not that there can 
be only one perception in our minds a t  a moment (for that is too clearly con- 
tradicted by the text), but that there can be only one apperception, only one 
conscious thought in our minds at any given moment. Given this assumption, 
and the assumption that a reflection is a conscious thought, it is easy to see 
how the presence of a continuous series of reflections would block us from 
ever passing to a new t h ~ u g h t . ~  
Of course, someone might claim that he sometimes has more than one 
conscious thought in his mind. And it might be argued that until this possi- 
bility is ruled out, Leibniz's argument is in trouble. This is a bit strong. 
Leibniz's argument is defensible (on the present count a t  least) as long as  the 
following plausible principle is granted: even if some humans can entertain 
more than one conscious thought at a moment, the maximum number that 
can be entertained is finite, and certainly fewer than the number of different 
new thoughts (conscious ones) that a person has in a normal lifetime. 
Once this principle is granted, Leibniz's argument can be revised to  deal 
with the possibility that a human might entertain more than one conscious 
thought at a time. Let n be the maximum number of conscious thoughts a 
human can have in mind a t  a moment. Assume that (A) every new thought is 
reflected on, and also every reflection. Then at the moment when a person 
(whom we will assume to have a normal life span) experiences his nth different 
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new thought, he will have reached the end of his interesting mental life: he will 
never be able to pass to  a new thought but will instead spend the rest of his 
days in continuous reflection on his earlier thoughts. This conflicts, however, 
with the last part of the principle set out  in the preceding paragraph. Hence 
the assumption about universal reflection (A) is to  be rejected. 
This resolves one possible difficulty with the view that a reflection, as a 
conscious thought, blocks us from passing to a new thought. But there is 
another difficulty, which arises whether we believe that the maximum number 
of conscious thoughts we can entertain at a moment is one o r  many. Why 
should we grant that, for Leibniz, each reflection is a conscious thought? 
What evidence is there that he holds this view? 
We have already encountered some evidence that on Leibniz's view each 
reflection is a conscious thought. (Recall the second main point concerning 
the experiential argument.) But the point is important enough, and leadsinto 
sufficiently interesting areas, that it merits further consideration. I shall 
proceed by first setting out a pair of alternatives about what happens when 
a chain of reflections ceases (as it must, according to Leibniz) and then 
presenting both systematic and more directly textual reasons for favoring one 
alternative over the other. With this as backdrop, I will summarize the reasons 
for thinking that a reflection is a conscious thought. 
T o  introduce the two alternatives, I reproduce part of the regress argument: 
But it is very necessary that I cease reflectinguponall these reflect~ons, and that there beat 
length some thought which IS allowed to pass without thinking of it; otherw~se, we should 
dwell always upon the same th~ng.  (Ln, p. 119; A vi. VI, 118) 
The question to  focus on is this: what happensat the moment when "at length 
some thought .  , . is allowed to pass without [my] thinking of it?" We know 
that this thought will not be reflected on; that is the point of the argument. But 
given the assumption that reflection is a conscious thought, we are left with 
two possibilities: ( 1 )  I d o  not perceive the thought a t  all (and hence d o  not 
reflect o n  it, since a reflection is, a t  a minimum, a perception of another 
perception); and (2) I do perceive the thought, but my perception of it is not a 
conscious thought (and hence not a reflection, given the assumption that a 
reflection is a conscious thought). The first alternative is perhaps what a 
reader of the regress argument would most naturally expect. But it is impor- 
tant to note that the second alternative is perfectly compatible with (and may 
even be suggested by) Leibniz's conclusion, namely, that "it is impossible for 
us always to  think expressly upon all our thoughts" (my emphasis). 
Leibniz may have room in his theory of perception not only forreflections, 
i.e., for what I am now assuming to be conscious perceptions of perception, 
but also for what might be called semi-reflections," i.e., perceptions of 
perceptions in which the higher level perceptions are not conscious. 
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It might be thought that the second possibility mentioned above is simply 
too far-fetched to  merit consideration. This is hardly the case. There is direct 
textual evidence that Leibniz would in  fact accept the claim that we perceive 
every thought, indeed every perception that we have. And there are  indica- 
tions that such a claim, namely, that we perceive every perception that we 
have (I might add, immediately after we have had it"), might play a n  important 
systematic role in a number of Leibnizian doctrines. 
We may consider the systematic role first. Leibniz claims that a substance 
expresses everything that happens in the universe. I have argued elsewhere 
that there is good reason to think that the particular type of expression 
involved here is perception,'2 that is, if a monad expresses everything, it 
perceives everything. Thus, if there were perceptions that were not perceived, 
Leibniz's expression thesis, in the general form it usually takes, would be 
contradicted.I3 
In the second place, there is the suggestion in the New Essays that just as 
reflection on thoughts serves to constitute the moral o r  personal identity of a 
human being, so  perception of perceptions serves to  constitute the real or  
metaphysical identity of a human being. Again, if it were not the case that 
every perception we have is itself perceived, this might contradict Leibniz's 
theory of metaphysical identity. (For text on this issue, see below.) 
In the third place, Leibniz maintains a view sometimes referred to as the 
doctrine of marks and traces, according to  which "each substance always 
contains in it traces of all that has happened to  it and marks of all that will 
happen to it" (G 11, p. 39). One way t o  interpret this doctrine is to view a 
monad as  a deterministic system such that a11 past and future states of the 
system are deducible given the present state of the system and its laws. O n  
this interpretation, nothing follows about a substance perceiving all its 
perceptions. But there is another possible interpretation of the doctrine, one 
in which a substance has all necessary marks and traces a t  a moment just in 
case it has, at  that moment, perceptions of all that has happened and all that 
will happen to it. If we did not perceive every perception immediately after we 
had it (though perhaps unconsciously), this interpretation would be contra- 
dicted. 
We find evidence for the second of these interpretations, and for the theory 
of real identity alluded to above, in one concentrated passage from the New 
Essays. Here too we find a part of the direct textual evidence that on Leibniz's 
view we perceive at  each moment the perceptions we had a moment before. 
An immaterial being o r  a splrit cannor be strrpped of all perception of ~ t s  past existence. 
There remain for it some impress~ons of all that has formerly happened to ~ t ,  and it even 
has some presentiments of all that w~l l  happen to lt; but these feellngs are most often too 
small to be capable of being distingu~shed and perceived, although they may perhaps 
sometime be developed. Thls continuation and bond ofperceprrons constitutes In real~ty 
the same individual, but the apperceptions (i.e., when past feelings are apperce~ved 
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[lorsyu'on s'uppercoit des wnflr??enrJ pa~shs]) prove bestdes a moral ident~ty and make 
real identity appear. (Ln, pp. 249-250; A VI. V1, 239) 
Leaving aside any mention of the relevance of this passage to Leibniz's 
theories of real identity and marks and traces, 1 shall simply note the strong 
suggestion here that on Leibniz's view we have at each moment perceptions 
of all our past and future perceptions, a,fortiori, of all perceptions which we 
have just had. 
A second passage provides direct textual evidence for the same point. Since 
it was written approximately twenty-five years before the New Essavs, there 
may be some question about its value as  evidence of Leibniz's later thought. 
The remarkable parallels between the earlier passage and the one containing 
the regress argument, however, suggest that it ought to  be taken seriously. 
It \ometimes happens that I cannot forget something, but involuntarily think of the same 
thing for almost an hour, and then think of t h ~ s  d~fficulty In think~ngand stupefy myself 
Into reflections through perpetual reflect~ons, so that I almost beg~n to doubt that I shall 
ever think of anything else . . But ~f you observe well, thts act will merely make you 
remember that you already had t h ~ s  In mlnd a little prev~ously, that IS, this reflectlon of 
reflect~on, and so you observe it and des~gnate it by a distinct Image accompanying ~t 
Therelore it already was In your m ~ n d  earlter, and so perceptton of perceptlon goes on 
perpetually In the mind to ~nfintty In ~t conslsts the existence of the mind per se and the 
necessity of 11s continuation. (L, p. 161) 
In the first place, it is obvious that Leibniz has, already a t  this early date, 
become aware of the possibility of an  unending sequence of reflections. In the 
second place, it is clear that he recognizes a possible consequence of such a 
sequence, namely, that it might prevent a person from ever thinking of any- 
thing else, that is, of ever passing to a new thought. Together these two points 
constitute a striking anticipation of the regress argument. But it is a third 
point that is of most interest. In this passage Leibniz distinguishes, with 
reasonable clarity, an unending sequence of reflections on reflections from a 
like sequence of perceptions of perceptions.14 The former he views as definitely 
problematic Cjust as he does in the New Essays); the latter, which is closely 
connected to the thesis I have been arguing for above, he accepts as obtaining 
in fact. (What is more, he links it closely to his views on identity, just as he 
does in the New Essaj,~.) 
It might be asked how the remarks of the preceding pagesare related to the 
question of whether a reflection is a conscious thought. They are related in 
this way: The upshot of those pages is that, on Leibniz's view, each perception 
in our minds is itself perceived immediately after it occurs. The consequence 
of this is, as Leibniz says, that "perception of perception goes on . . . in the 
mind to infinity." Now if a reflection is nothing more than a perception of a 
perception (we know it is a t  least this15), then reflections on reflections also go 
on to  infinity, directly contradicting a central claim of the regress argument. 
But if a reflection is a conscious thought (if, for instance, it is a perception of 
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a perception in which the higher level perception is a conscious one), then we 
cnn allow infinite sequences of perceptions of perceptions without commit- 
ting obrsri;.:; t o  infinite sequences of reflections of reflections. 
Again. ~f a reflection is nothing more than a perception of a perception 
(there being no necessity that the higher level perception be conscious), then 
it is hard to  see why the reflections in a long chain of reflections would neces- 
sarily block passage to a new thought any more than d o  the infinitely many 
pptltes perceptions that are always present in the mind. If, on  the other hand, 
we allow that a reflection is a conscious perception of a perception, it becomes 
quite plausible that a chain of reflections (or perhaps several of them) would 
block passage to a new thought, and the regress argument retains its plausi- 
bility. 
Neither of these points shows conclusively that for Leibniz a reflection is a 
conscious thought. But taken together with the second point discussed in 
connection with the experiential argument, they suggest strongly that this is 
the case. 
111. Conclusions 
In this section I summarbe the chief points of this paper. 
I .  The claim that we cannot be directly aware of our petites perceptions 
rnust be qualified. Petites perceptions are  not, it is true, reflected on orapper- 
ceived immediately after they occur. But they can be, and in some cases are, 
remembered or apperceived o r  reflected on after some time has passed. This 
point makes the experiential argument for the existence ofpetites perceptions 
possible. 
2. It is not impossible that we have within us unending sequences of 
reflections on reflections; rather, this is not in fact the case. 
3. Certain temporal difficulties connected with the regress argument can 
be resolved, consistently with the text, by means of the theory proposed in 
section IIB, Two key elements of that  theory are 
(i) the view that  perceptions and reflections are not instantaneous 
events but actions that take some time to perform, and 
(ii) a definition of 'immediately after.' 
4. A reflection is a conscious thought. 
5. There is evidence that for Leibniz each perception in our minds is the 
object of another perception (not necessarily conscious) that occurs immedi- 
ately after the first. 
6. There is even evidence that on Leibniz's view we perceive at  every 
moment all our former perceptions. 
(With respect to  5 and 6, it seems that the most interesting evidence, and 
perhaps the most interesting application of the work of this paper, will be 
found in Leibniz's theory of real or  metaphysical identity.) 
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7. It is not correct to say that perites perceptions are simply perceptions 
that are not perceived. Rather, they are perceptions that are not consciously 
perceived immediately after they occur. 
NOTES 
In t h ~ s  paper I use the followingabbreviat~ons for cltat~ons: A =Gottfr~ed Wilhelm Leibnlz. 
Sanrrlrthe Sclirrften und Brrefe, Academy edit~on (Darmstadt and Berlin, 1923-); G = Die 
phrlosophrschen Schrrften von Gottfrred Wrlhelm Lerbnrz, C I. Gerhardt, ed., 7 vols (Berlin, 
1875-1 890); L = Gotrfrred Wrlhelrn Lerbnrz: Phrlorophrcal Papers and Letters, edited and trans- 
lated by L. E. Loemker, second edition (Dordrecht, 1969); Ln = New' Es~avr Concernrng Human 
Understandrng by Gottfrred Wrlhelm Lerbnrz, translated by A. G. Langley (New York, 1896). 
I L, p 644. As the c l a ~ m  Indicates, Leibniz uses the term 'perception'in a very broad sense. 
2, Problems of terminology abound. in addition to  )errre percept~on,' we are confronted 
with the terms 'apperceive,"reflect on,'and 'not~ce.' It would be best, ofcourse, to  have clear and 
precise defin~tions of all of these Unfortunately, such definitions are not easy tocome by. In this 
paper I shall take steps toward developing them, but I d o  not claim to work out any in full detail 
For the present 1 shall content myself with the following points about these terms: (I) Robert 
McRae, in h ~ s  Lerhnis Perception, Apperceprron, and Thought (Toronto and Buffalo, 1976), 
p. 33,clalms that for Leibniz the terms'appercept~on,"consciousness,'and 'reflection'areequ~va- 
lent; I shall accept thls and add that In at least some of its uses 'not~c~ng'should be added to the 
l~st ,  (2) a perrte perception IS o t  necessartly one whlch IS never not~ced, apperceived, or reflected 
upon; as we shall see below, it is one which 1s not noticed, apperceived, or reflected upon irnviedi- 
atelv after it occurs. 
3. It might seem more natural to say that one noticed or apperceived the noise rather than 
the perception of the noise. (I  am assuming-and think the passage makes ~t appropriate to 
assume-that the norse IS not Itself an event In A's or BS mind.) At least In theexper~ential argu- 
ment, however, it is clear that Leibnii: is talkrng about noticing or apperceiving a perception 
Therefore, I shall talk In this way too. 
4. For a more exact treatment of the temporal elements of this case, see below. 
5. That is, d reflect~ons occur instantaneously See below for a cons~derat~on f this condlt~on. 
6. It 1s true that t h ~ s  quotation occurs in a passage discussing the actions of bodles, but 
glven the close connection between actlons in bodles and monads (see Ln, pp 174-175 and L, p. 
579), it seems plausible to extend the claim to the ac t~ons  of monads. 
7. It IS true that on t h ~ s  theory we cannottalk about the moment at which reflect~on r begins, 
for there is no such moment But ~t does not follow from t h ~ s  that we are left w ~ t h  some d~fflculty 
about just when 11 occurs, for we have spec~fied thls qulte exactly. 
8. For some, the claim of sectlon seventeen of the Monaciolog~~ that there ts nothing to be 
found In slmple substances but perceptions and their changes will be suffic~ent o support thls. 
For others, a passage later In the Nenf Ersai F should be conclus~ve, though a btt of study IS needed 
to see this (v Ln, p. 248). 
9. Here and in what follows I assume a n  understanding of the phrase, 'consc~ous thought.' I 
am not altogether happy in doing thls, at least in part because the questlon of what a conscious 
thought is l ~ e s  close beneath the surface throughout the New E~~al lrand in the regress argument 
Itself. Nonetheless. the difficulty of the questton leads me to adopt thts course of ac t~on .  
10 I coin t h ~ s  term tn analogy to  Le~bn~z's own term, "seml-pa~ns." (See Ln, p 170 ) 
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I 1. Some confusion may arise because of the considerable number of views possible concern- 
ing the perception of perceptions. I shall here list some of them. making comments where 
appropriate. (These are not quotations from Leibniz, but views which might be attributed to hlm.) 
(I) The only time we have a perception of a perception is when we reflect on a per- 
ceptton (Comment this is a view that is probably common among readers of the Neb%, 
Ersavs One of the purposes of this paper is to present the case against it It might be noted 
that ~f ( I )  were correct, then oniy spirits could have perceptlons of perceptlons, for "the 
soul of a beast has no more reflection than an atom" [L, p 588: presumably the same 
polnt applies to  bare monads]. Thls 1s not In itselfan objectton to  (I) but might serveas the 
basis for one, particularly tf perceptions of perceptlons turned out to be essential in the 
explanation of the real or metaphysical Identity of all monads, not just spirits ) 
(2) Monads can, and sometimes do, percelve a perception wlthout reflecting on tt, 
but it is not the case that they perceive everr perception they have had, o r  even every 
perceptton they have just had. (Comment: (2) could ~tself be dtvided Into a great many 
d~fferent views.) 
(3) At each moment each sp i r~ t  perceives all the perceptlons which it has just had, 
(Comment ~t 1s obv~ous that thls leads to the mew that there are Infinite sequences of 
perceptions of perceptions This is perfectly compatible, however, with the denlal of the 
vlew that there are tnfinite sequences of [conscious] reflecttons ) 
(4) At each moment each spirit perceives all the perceptions it has ever had, i e., all the 
perceptlons it has had before the moment in question. (Comment. the prollferatlon of 
perceptlons becomes mind-boggling at  this polnt. Nonetheless, we shall soon encounter 
textual evidence that Lelbnlz accepts this and more.) 
(5) At each moment each spirit perceives all the perceptions it has had before that 
moment and all the perceptions it will have after that moment, 
( 6 ) ,  (7), and (8). Substitute 'monad' for 'spirit' in (3),  (4), and (5) 
12. See Mark Kulstad, "Lelbniz's Expression Thesls," unpublished Ph D. dissertation 
(University of Michigan, 1975), chapter 2 
13 To solidify the potnt, ~t should be noted that Leibni? viewsa perception as someth~ng that 
happens to a substance. "nothingcan happen to useexcept thoughts and percept~ons"(D~rroztrre 
on Metaph~.\~c.c, sectton 14). 
14. It might be objected that hts phrase, "this reflection of reflection," opposes the dlstlnction 
I am clalmlng, or at least shows that Lelbniz was somewhat confused I d o  not think so The 
context reveals that the phrase refers to a process of which we are not conscious. This does 
conflict wlth the usage of the New Ervavr, where'reflection'seems to be found only in connection 
wtth conscious processes But the conflict IS only verbal If the word'reflectlons'in my statement 
of the distinction is taken to refer to consctous acts, ~t seemy to me that the statement is correct. 
15. See Ln, pp. 119 and 248 for confirmation (although not an explicit statement) of this 
view. 
